Abstract
The article examines the landmark 2018 Supreme Court decision that clarified the legal capacity of intestate heirs to sue or be sued without obtaining Letters of Administration. The Court carefully distinguished its facts from prior binding precedents, such as Okyere v Appenteng and Adoma, which required vesting assent or Letters of Administration before beneficiaries could litigate estate matters. By recognizing the immediate legal interest conferred on children of a deceased intestate under PNDC Law 111, the Supreme Court created a narrow but significant exception that enables heirs in peaceful possession to assert their rights directly. Importantly, the Court did not expressly overrule the Estate Act or existing judicial authority; instead, it issued a nuanced ruling balancing statutory formalities with substantive justice and the realities of customary and intestate succession. This decision marks a judicial incision rather than a departure, highlighting evolving judicial attitudes toward capacity objections while preserving the core principles of estate administration law. The article explores this balance and the lasting implications of the ruling for estate and land law in Ghana.
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Adisa Boya v Zenabu Mohammed (2018) has generated significant discussion regarding the long-standing legal principle that beneficiaries of deceased estates must obtain Letters of Administration or vesting assent before initiating or defending legal actions.^1 This requirement has traditionally been rooted in the Estate Act 1961 (Act 63)^2 and consistently upheld by judicial precedent.^3 However, a careful analysis of the Adisa Boya ruling reveals that the Court did not outright overrule this established statutory position. Instead, it meticulously carved out an important exception, specifically tailored to address the unique realities of intestate succession under PNDC Law 111^4 and customary law.^5
In essence, the Adisa Boya case represents a “judicial incision” rather than a complete departure from existing legal principles.^6 This means the Court refined the application of the law, creating a specific allowance without dismantling the broader legal framework. The decision is considered a “revolutionary” or “radical proposition” by some legal scholars, signaling an alternative perspective to certain established legal principles.^7 The Supreme Court, speaking through Gbadegbe JSC, held that the defendants, as children of the estate, possessed an immediate interest in the property. For this reason, they were deemed competent to defend or even sue for a declaration of title, notwithstanding the absence of Letters of Administration.^8 This outcome highlights a potential shift in the courts’ approach to objections concerning legal capacity, suggesting that such objections may not always be permissible at any stage in civil proceedings. The Court’s emphasis on justice and the equity of a case may, in certain circumstances, override a party’s legal right to raise an objection to capacity at any time.^9
Facts of the Case
The facts concerned a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land originally granted by the Hia-Topre stool of Ayigya. Both parties claimed title through customary grants obtained from the stool. The plaintiff alleged obtaining his grant in the 1990s and later formalizing it with a leasehold document. The defendants claimed through their deceased father, asserting he had received an earlier grant in 1970, entered possession, built a residence, and paid property rates prior to the plaintiff.^10
The plaintiff accused the defendants of encroachment, leading to the first defendant’s conviction for obstruction. The trial court ruled for the plaintiff, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, recognizing the defendants’ earlier grant and continuous possession as superseding the plaintiff’s claim. The Supreme Court then considered the defendants’ capacity to counterclaim without Letters of Administration,^11 affirming the Court of Appeal’s ruling. The Court held the children had an immediate legal interest under intestate succession rules (PNDC Law 111) and, therefore, capacity to sue or be sued without Letters of Administration.^12 The Court underscored the importance of substantive justice and avoiding multiple suits, deeming late technical objections to capacity inadmissible.^13
Issues for Consideration
The key issues posed to the Supreme Court revolved around whether or not:
1. The defendants, as intestate beneficiaries and children of the deceased, had legal capacity to sue or counterclaim without Letters of Administration or vesting assent.
2. A subsequent land grant to the plaintiff was valid in the face of a prior customary grant.
3. Customary land grants must be evidenced in writing to be legally valid and enforceable.
4. The conviction of the first defendant in a related criminal case constituted res judicata or estoppel regarding ownership.
5. Courts must avoid multiplicity of actions by resolving all disputes, including title, in one proceeding to achieve finality.
These boiled down to clarifying beneficiary capacity under intestate law, validity of competing customary grants, and procedural efficiency in estate disputes.^14
Holding of the Court
The Court held that, under section 4(1)(a) of PNDC Law 111, intestate property devolves immediately upon a deceased’s children, granting them an immediate legal interest sufficient to sue or defend estate claims without Letters of Administration or vesting assent.^15
The Court distinguished Okyere v Appenteng and Adoma, where locus standi depended on vesting assent and involved testate succession and non-child defendants.^16 In Adisa Boya, the intestate children’s immediate interest rendered the Okyere principle non-binding in this context.^17
While recognizing the Estate Act’s general requirement for Letters of Administration, the Court found this was not an absolute bar where beneficiaries have immediate legal interest by operation of intestate succession law.^18 This avoided procedural technicalities defeating substantive justice and reduced multiplicity of proceedings.^19 Moreover, an objection to the defendants’ capacity raised late was untimely and impermissible.^20
In sum, the holding affirmed:
a) Beneficiaries under intestate succession have immediate legal interest conferring capacity to sue or defend without Letters of Administration.
b) The general statutory requirement for Letters remains, but exceptions apply to ensure justice and finality.
c) Earlier case law on vesting assent, including Okyere, does not strictly govern intestate heirs in peaceful possession.
d) Procedural objections on capacity raised late may be barred to prevent abuse and uphold justice.
This constitutes a reasoned, pragmatic exception without overruling the Estate Act or established precedents.^21
Ratio Decidendi
The ratio decidendi is twofold:
1. Under intestate succession laws (PNDC Law 111), beneficiaries acquire immediate legal interest on death of the intestate and therefore capacity to sue or be sued without Letters of Administration, especially when in possession.^22
2. A valid prior customary grant coupled with possession invalidates subsequent grants of the same land. Writing is not essential for a customary grant; formal conveyance supplements but does not override prior customary title.^23
Established Legal Position on Letters of Administration Before Adisa Boya
Before Adisa Boya, Ghanaian law, grounded in the Estate Act 1961 and confirmed by Supreme Court rulings, held that beneficiaries lacked legal capacity to litigate estate matters without Letters of Administration or vesting assent granted by a court.^24 This ensured estate administration remained properly authorized and orderly.^25 Cases like Akrong v Bulley, Prah v Ampah, and Djin v Musa Baako affirm that Letters of Administration are a strict prerequisite to confer locus standi for estate litigation.^26 Accordingly, courts routinely raised and enforced the capacity objection to non-personal representatives who sued without letters.^27
Adisa Boya as an Exception
The Supreme Court in Adisa Boya created a narrow exception for intestate heirs—particularly children under PNDC Law 111 who acquire immediate interest sufficient to confer capacity without Letters of Administration.^28 The Court emphasized substantive justice and the avoidance of multiplicity of suits.^29 However, it did not expressly depart from or overrule prior binding precedents requiring Letters of Administration, as required by Article 129(3) of the Constitution.^30 Instead, it cast doubt on prior authority and carved out a factual exception for intestate heirs in possession.^31
Practitioners and courts continue to apply the general rule, invoking Adisa Boya cautiously when heirs are in possession and administrators inactive or uncooperative.^32
Did the Court Overrule Existing Law?
The Court did not explicitly overrule the Estate Act or established precedents; it distinguished Adisa Boya facts from earlier cases involving testate succession or non-child defendants,^33 recognizing equitable exceptions to avoid injustice and multiplicity of litigation.^34 It acknowledged that beneficiaries’ rights under intestate and customary law coexist with statutory administration requirements but do not displace those rules entirely.^35
Several scholars describe this as a “judicial incision” rather than a wholesale departure, respecting Article 129(3) requirements for overruling precedent through explicit statements.^36
Balancing Statutory Scheme and Substantive Justice
Adisa Boya exemplifies the Court’s balancing act between enforcing the Estate Act’s orderly administration framework and ensuring substantive justice for intestate heirs vested immediately by operation of law.^37 The Court preserves the general rule requiring Letters of Administration but allows exceptions where procedural formality would cause injustice or multiple lawsuits, particularly for heirs already in peaceful possession.^38 This approach promotes equitable access to justice while maintaining estate administration integrity.^39
Future Implications
Adisa Boya is likely to remain a carefully circumscribed exception rather than triggering a broad change in estate law.^40 Courts respect the Estate Act and established precedents but apply Adisa Boya flexibly to prevent unjust denial of heirs’ rights when administrators fail or estates are intestate.^41 The decision encourages a more pragmatic judicial stance on capacity objections, especially where substantive justice demands relief.^42
This nuanced approach reflects Ghana’s dual legal system, balancing customary and statutory law in estate succession, and will continue to influence estate and land litigation.^43
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Adisa Boya upheld the statutory framework requiring Letters of Administration but acknowledged limited exceptions for intestate heirs under PNDC Law 111. This ruling injects nuance into estate administration law, encouraging access to justice for rightful heirs while preserving legal certainty and administrative order. For practitioners and scholars, it highlights the importance of contextual statutory interpretation that harmonizes formal rules with equitable outcomes.
Footnotes
1. Adisa Boya v Zenabu Mohammed SC (Ghana).
2. Estate Act 1961 (Act 63) (Ghana).
3. Okyere (Deceased) v Appenteng and Adoma SC (Ghana).
4. Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDC Law 111) (Ghana); see generally Inheritance Law In Ghana B&P Associates, 2024 https://bpaghana.com/inheritance-law-in-ghana accessed 22 July 2025.
5. Adisa Boya (n 1).
6. K Agbedo, ‘Adisa Boya’s Judicial Incision in Ghana’s Estate Litigation’ (2020) 15 African J. Law and Justice 112; see also Adisa Boya (n 1).
7. Agbedo (n 6).
8. Adisa Boya (n 1) per Gbadegbe JSC.
9. ibid.
10. Adisa Boya (n 1).
11. ibid.
12. ibid.
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. PNDC Law 111 s 4(1)(a); see Adisa Boya (n 1).
16. Okyere v Appenteng and Adoma (n 3).
17. Adisa Boya (n 1).
18. Estate Act 1961 (Act 63); Adisa Boya (n 1).
19. Adisa Boya (n 1).
20. ibid.
21. ibid.
22. PNDC Law 111 s 4(1) (n 4); Adisa Boya (n 1).
23. Adisa Boya (n 1).
24. Estate Act 1961 (Act 63) (n 2); Akrong v Bulley 1 GLR 110; Prah v Ampah 1 GLR 393; Djin v Musa Baako 2007-2008 SCGLR 716.
25. ibid.
26. ibid.
27. ibid.
28. Adisa Boya (n 1).
29. ibid.
30. Constitution of Ghana 1992, art 129(3).
31. Adisa Boya (n 1).
32. ibid.
33. Okyere (n 3); Adisa Boya (n 1).
34. Adisa Boya (n 1).
35. ibid.
36. Agbedo (n 6).
37. Adisa Boya (n 1).
38. ibid.
39. ibid.
40. ibid; see scholarly commentary e.g. Agbedo (n 6).
41. ibid.
42. ibid.
43. ibid; PNDC Law 111 (n 4); Estate Act 1961 (n 2).