Abstract:
Labour law seeks to strike a delicate balance between protecting the rights of employees and that of the employer’s interest. To this end, the law of dismissal or termination of employment seems, arguably, to be the cornerstone of labour law, shaping the delicate balance between an employer’s authority to manage their workforce and the protections afforded to employees. Employers require the power to discipline and, if necessary, dismiss employees to ensure operational efficiency and the economic success of the enterprise. However, this power must be exercised within legal constraints that safeguard employees’ livelihoods and social standing. The stakes are uneven: while employers face the costs of recruitment and training, employees risk losing income, career progression, and social inclusion.
This paper explores the evolving legal landscape of employment termination in Ghana, highlighting the tension between the employer’s traditional common law right to dismiss without cause and the statutory protections against unfair termination. The paper argues that while Ghana’s Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), retains an employer’s right to terminate the employment of an employee without providing a reason, this right is increasingly constrained by statutory provisions and the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence between the two parties. Thus, the right to terminate without reason, we argue, has been significantly whittled away by statute and contemporary trends, and less weight ought to be accorded to it than the Supreme Court of Ghana has consistently held.
The paper critically examines the Ghanaian Supreme Court’s reliance on common law principles in contemporary rulings, arguing that these principles should be reassessed in light of statutory developments and the broader international context to promote a more balanced approach that considers both parties’ interests in the employment relationship. Through an analysis of legislative intent, key provisions, and relevant case law, this paper underscores the need for a nuanced legal framework that better aligns with modern labour standards and the realities of the Ghanaian labour market.
Introduction:
At common law, at least, until the advent of legislative interventions, the law that governed employment relationship between the employer and the employee was and is still largely the terms of the contract of employment.[1] This was traditionally referred to as the concept of master servant relationship.[2] This concept was usually manifested through various tests which were developed by the courts over time, such as the "control," "integration," and "economic reality" tests.[3] This concept delineates the boundaries of managerial authority, granting employers the right to issue orders and expect loyalty from employees while simultaneously protecting employees from specific risks.[4] The concept, also, applied the ordinary principles of contract law to employment relations by affirming the principles of good faith and freedom of contract—otherwise known as party autonomy.[5] By the application of these principles, each party had the right to negotiate the terms of the employment including the terms of termination. The principle thus evolved that because of party autonomy, a party could not be forced to remain in a contract of employment; neither could the employer be compelled to retain an employee against his business interest—since a contract of employment is not a contract of servitude.[6] This principle postulated that either the employer or the employee could terminate the contract of employment without cause or assigning any reason.[7]
In the course of time, however, the right to terminate employment without cause, has been significantly curtailed by contemporary statutory developments in many jurisdictions—even in the country of its birth, including Ghana. The Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), while preserving certain elements of the common law right to terminate without reason, introduces significant constraints that reflect a broader shift towards fairness and accountability in employment relations.[8] These constraints include statutory protections against unfair dismissal/termination and the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence between the employer and the employee, which collectively limit the unfettered exercise of the dismissal power.
In light of these statutory and judicial developments, Ghanaian labour law, it is argued, has evolved beyond its common law foundations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s reliance on traditional common law principles, to hold that the common law right of an employer to terminate without cause, the employment of the employee, is still applicable in full force, without measure, is, with respect, misconceived.[9] The paper argues that contemporary trends in labour law emphasise the importance of due process, fairness, and the protection of employees against arbitrary dismissal, moving away from a rigid adherence to common law doctrines.
The paper seeks to critically analyse the current state of Ghanaian labour law in light of these evolving standards, statutory inroads and broader international context. It examines how statutory provisions under the Labour Act, 2003, particularly concerning unfair termination, and the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence have gradually undermined the common law right of employers to terminate without cause. The paper also explores how these changes should influence judicial interpretations, particularly those of the Supreme Court, advocating for a more balanced approach that reflects contemporary labour standards.
By doing so, the paper underscores the importance of revisiting traditional principles in light of statutory developments, advocating for a nuanced approach that accommodates the realities of the contemporary labour market in Ghana.
Historical Context and Evolution of Labour Law in Ghana
Ghana, being a former British colony, received and applied the common law principles on employment relations between an employer and an employee with effect from the 24th day of July 1874.[10] Ghana, however, passed the Industrial Relations Act, (Act 299) in 1965 upon gaining independence. This law established labour rights for employees in both the public and private sectors and was the first legislation to formally recognise collective bargaining between employers and employees. [11] In 1971, however, a new Industrial Relations Act was introduced with the specific purpose of abolishing the Trades Union Congress (TUC). It had been argued that this move was politically motivated due to the TUC’s strong connections with the Convention People’s Party.[12] Despite this, Act 299 was reinstated by a new government in January 1972. Apart from its brief suspension in 1971, Act 299 remained the primary law regulating labour relations in Ghana until 2003, making it the country’s longest-standing labour legislation, despite undergoing several amendments.
In 1992, when Ghana adopted the 1992 Constitution, article 24 recognises the right of every person to work under satisfactory conditions and to receive equal pay for equal work than. In furtherance of this constitutional safeguard, and in line with international obligations, Ghana promulgated the Labour Act (Act 651) in 2003 with the aim to among others ‘bring the existing enactments on labour into conformity with the Constitution and the several International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions to which Ghana is a signatory and to consolidate the several pieces of enactments on the subject into one statute’.[13] The Memorandum also provides that that the bill sought to bring within the law, good practices in labour law that had developed over the years and formed part of contemporary practices.[14]
Act 651 seeks to promote a balance environment in relation to the rights of both employers and employees. The rights of an employer under the Act are extensive and cover various aspects of managing a business. Employers have the authority to hire workers, discipline them, transfer or promote them and terminate their employment.[15] Additionally, employers can formulate policies, execute plans, modify or extend operations and decide on the types of products and services to offer, including their pricing.[16] This autonomy is fundamental to maintaining managerial prerogatives and ensuring that businesses can operate efficiently and competitively. However, these rights are balanced by a set of duties that hat employers must fulfil. Employers are obligated to provide suitable work conditions, including necessary materials, machinery and tools, and must pay agreed-upon wages promptly.[17] They must take all practicable measures to ensure the safety and health of their workers, reflecting a strong commitment to occupational safety and health standards.[18] Employers are also required to develop their workforce through training and retraining initiatives and to establish fair disciplinary procedures.[19] Further, they must maintain clear channels of communication and safeguard the interests of their employees, ensuring a collaborative and transparent workplace environment.[20]
Workers, on the other hand, are granted several rights to protect their welfare and promote fair labour practices. These rights include the entitlement to work under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions, receive equal pay for equal work, and enjoy reasonable working hours, rest periods and holidays with pay.[21] Workers also have the right to form or join trade unions, receive training to enhance their skills and access information relevant to their roles. These provisions aim to foster a supportive work environment where employees feel valued and secure.[22]
Alongside these rights, workers also have duties to uphold in their employment relationships. They are expected to perform their duties conscientiously, report to work regularly and punctually and strive to enhance productivity.[23] Workers must exercise due care in their tasks, obey lawful instructions and take reasonable precautions to ensure the safety and health of themselves and their colleagues. Additionally, they are required to protect their employer’s interests and take proper care of any property entrusted to them.[24]
In essence, the Act balances employer authority with employee protections, promoting fair and equitable labour practices in Ghana.
Overview of the Common Law Right of the Employer or Employee to Terminate Employment without Cause
At common law, the general rule is that either the employer or employee has the right to terminate the employment relationship without assigning any reason provided the requisite notice requirements were met, which notice requirements, in itself, is dependent on the nature of the employment.[25] This principle was based on the notion that a person cannot be compelled to work for another person or to employ a person against the interest of the business.[26] Therefore, at common law, an action for wrongful dismissal was normally not concerned with the wrongness or rightness of the decision to dismiss the employee; rather, it was concerned with whether the requisite notice period had been complied with. In other words, an employment contract was equated to an ordinary commercial contract where either party has the right to terminate the contract, subject to notice requirements. Where the employee is dismissed without the requisite notice, then his only cause of action is damages for breach of contract.[27]
In general contract law, if one party wrongfully ends a contract, this does not automatically terminate the contract unless the act makes continuing the contract completely impossible.[28] However, in employment law, wrongful dismissal is often treated as an exception to this rule. Even if an employee does not accept a wrongful dismissal, the contract is usually considered terminated because common law and equitable remedies typically do not embrace the continued enforcement of an employment contract after wrongful dismissal.[29] It has been suggested that wrongful dismissal does not necessarily end the employment contract unless the employee accepts it as a termination. This view, however, does not seem to hold sway at least in respect of the common law, since an action for wrongful dismissal at common law only gives rise to an action for damages for wrongful dismissal and not reinstatement.[30]
Prior to the promulgation of the Labour Act, the Ghanaian Courts had consistently applied the common law principle that either party to an employment contract is entitled to terminate the contract upon giving the required notice.[31] This principle of the common law has been recognised by section 17 of the Labour Act which provides as follows:
“A contract of employment may be terminated at anytime by either party giving to the other party,
(a)in the case of a contract of three years or more, one month’s notice or one month’s pay in lieu of notice;
(b)in the case of a contract of less than three years, two weeks' notice or two weeks’ pay in lieu of notice; or
(c) in the case of contract from week to week, seven days’ notice.
(2) A contract of employment determinable at will by either party may be terminated at the close of any day without notice.
(3) A notice required to be given under this section shall be in writing.
(4) The day on which the notice is given shall be included in the period of the notice.”
The Act also provides in section 18 to the effect that despite section 17 (1), either party to a contract of employment may terminate the contract without notice if that party pays to the other party a sum equal to the amount of remuneration which would have accrued to the worker during the period of the notice.
The combined effect of these provisions shows that indeed, Act 651 did not abolish the common law right of either party to a contract of employment to terminate without reason. It is in consonance with these provisions that the Supreme Court has consistently held that under Ghana’s labour law, an employer does not have an obligation to assign reasons for terminating the employment of an employee.[32] In the recent case of General Transport & Anor v. Halliburton International Incorporated Ghana Branch,[33] the Supreme Court affirmed, wholesale, the common law principle when it stated through Kulendin JSC at paragraph 33 of the judgment thus:
“This section encapsulates the essence of the common law right of either an employer or employee to terminate an employment relationship at will, upon the provision of the appropriate notice or payment in lieu of such notice. Strictly, an employer, in exercise of this right, need not assign reasons for the termination of an employee under this section.”
This paper contends, however, that contrary to the position of the Supreme Court, although Act 651 retains the common law right to terminate without assigning reasons, that right has been significantly affected by other provisions of Act 651 and contemporary developments in labour law that the Supreme Court overlooked.
The Diminishing Common Law Right of Employers to Dismiss Without Cause
Labour law has progressed so much so that it is now no longer regarded as merely a master-servant relationship, but one that creates a relational interest between both employers and employees where employees are no longer regarded as merely being appendages of employers who are required to answer “yes” to everything that is commanded of them by their employers. Indeed, the UK Supreme Court, in realisation of this change in dynamics portended in the case of Johnson v. Unisy as follows:[34]
“But over the last 30 years or so, the nature of the contract of employment has been transformed. It has been recognised that a person's employment is usually one of the most important things in his or her life. It gives not only a livelihood but an occupation, an identity and a sense of self-esteem. The law has changed to recognise this social reality. Most of the changes have been made by Parliament. The Employment Rights Act 1996 consolidates numerous statutes which have conferred rights upon employees. European law has made a substantial contribution. And the common law has adapted itself to the new attitudes, proceeding sometimes by analogy with statutory rights.”
Professor Hugh also argues that the common law rule that allows an employer to terminate or dismiss an employee without assigning any reason(s) is a 19th Century relic that no longer serve any useful purpose in contemporary times in light of statutory interventions and the development of the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence.[35]
It is thus obvious, that the common law rule saw a decline in prominence even in the land of its birth until it was completely obliterated by the Employment Rights Act, 1996. But before then, the common law saw the development of the principle of implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence on the part of the employer. This principle is to the effect that the employer would not without reasonable cause conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between itself and the employee.[36] This principle was also referred to as the obligation of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the employer. Indeed, according to Treitel on Contract, this obligation is overarching and is one that is imposed by law to the effect that employers must exhibit certain minimum standards of behaviour towards employees.[37] The obligation of mutual trust and confidence thus forms part of every employment contract unless contracted out of.
Also, in Mahmud v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [38]the House of Lords acknowledged that the common law, which evolves over time, might have reached a point where it would be reasonable to replace the outdated master-servant rule with an implied term based on mutual trust and confidence or a standard of good faith. Such a change could limit an employer's ability to dismiss employees arbitrarily without assigning reasons or following a fair procedure. However, the House of Lords ultimately decided that Parliament had already tackled this issue through the statutory law on unfair dismissal, making it unnecessary to modify the common law.
Professor Hugh also adds further light to this when he contends that that the obligation of mutual trust and confidence imposes an obligation on the employer not to dismiss the employment of the employee without assigning reasons.[39] Accordingly, even under the common law, the right of the employer to dismiss without cause was significantly diminished before the intervention by the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and the Employment Rights Act of 1996.
Procedural and Substantive Limitations on the Right to Dismiss Without Cause Under the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651)
Although the Labour Act recognises the right of the employer to terminate the employment of a worker without assigning reasons, that right is not absolute as the Supreme Court of Ghana has consistently portrayed; rather, we argue that this right is now subject to other provisions of the Labour Act that have significantly whittled away this common law right to terminate without cause.
Act 651 provides a statutory safeguard against unfair and arbitrary termination of employment of workers by employers. Under the Act, a termination of employment is deemed fair when it is carried out by an employer on specific grounds. First, if a worker is found to be incompetent or lacks the necessary qualifications for the job, the employer has the right to terminate their employment.[40] Second, proven misconduct by the worker, such as violations of company policies or engaging in unethical behaviour, can also justify termination.[41] Additionally, a worker may be terminated fairly in cases of redundancy, as stipulated in section 65 of the Labour Act, which occurs when the worker’s position is no longer needed due to economic or structural changes within the organisation.[42] Finally, a fair termination may occur if a legal restriction prevents the worker from fulfilling their job duties, making it impossible for the employment to continue.[43]
In contrast, a termination is considered unfair when it occurs for reasons that are discriminatory or unjust.[44] For instance, it is unfair if a worker is dismissed solely because they joined or plan to join a trade union or are actively participating in union activities.[45] Similarly, it is unjust to terminate an employee who seeks office as a workers’ representative or has filed a complaint against the employer for violating employment laws.[46] Termination based on personal attributes such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or social and political status is also deemed unfair.[47] Additional protections apply to women workers; for example, dismissal due to pregnancy or absence during maternity leave is considered unfair. Workers with disabilities are also protected against termination solely based on their disability. Furthermore, terminating a worker who is temporarily ill or injured, as certified by a recognised medical practitioner, is considered unfair.[48] It is also unjust to terminate a worker for lacking qualifications that were not required when they were initially employed. Finally, an employer cannot fairly terminate a worker for refusing to do the job of another worker who is on a lawful strike, except in situations where such work is necessary to prevent immediate danger to life, personal safety, or the maintenance of equipment.
Moreover, a worker’s resignation may also be considered an unfair termination in certain circumstances. If a worker resigns because of consistent ill-treatment by the employer or if the employer fails to address repeated complaints of sexual harassment, the resignation is treated as an unfair termination.[49]
Act 651 casts the burden of proving that the termination of a worker’s employment is fair on the employer.[50] To enable an employer, show that the termination of a worker’s employment was fair, the employer is required to prove at least one of the two conditions stated below:
- The employer is required to prove that the reason for the termination was fair; or that
- The termination was made in accordance with fair procedure, or the labour Act.
By a combined reading of section 63(1)(2)(3)(4), it is noted that under section 63(2)(3), the employee has the burden of establishing that the grounds for the termination of his employment is unfair by establishing that the reason only, for the termination of his employment is based on any of those grounds. When that has been done, then the termination of his employment will be deemed to be unfair. When this is satisfactorily proved, the burden shifts to the employer under section 63(4) to prove that the termination is fair through any of the means above.
It is respectfully submitted that these provisions inherently impose a duty on the employer to provide reasons for terminating the employment of an employee; otherwise, it would be practically impossible for the employee to prove an unfair termination complaint thereby defeating the objectives of the Act. Accordingly, because Act 651 allows for an employee to file a complaint of unfair termination against an employer, there is irresistibly an obligation on the employer to provide the reasons for termination that will enable the employee to maintain his claim before the National Labour Commission.
It is submitted, respectfully, that the obligation on the employer to prove that the termination of a worker’s employment is fair by showing that same is compliant with the Labour Act should be interpreted as referrable to establishing the procedural and substantive fairness of the termination and not one that solidifies the common law right of an employer to terminate without reasons as the Supreme Court of Ghana has consistently portrayed. It must be recognised that section 63 and 64 are statutory innovations that allow a worker to challenge the termination of his employment on account of the fairness or otherwise of same before the National Labour Commission (NLC); whereas under the common law the only remedy available to a worker for the termination of his employment was an action for damages for wrongful termination. Therefore, bearing in mind that Act 651 was enacted to bring it into conformity with international standards, and then the statutory inroads made under section 63 and 64, it is not conceptually correct to say that when an employer is called upon to prove the fairness of the termination of an employee’s employment, he would be deemed to discharge that duty if he shows that what he did is in accordance with his common law right to terminate without cause. That position, quite respectfully, constitutes a misunderstanding of what the true import of fair and unfair termination really implies within the purview of section 63 and 64 of Act 651.
Fairness, in ordinary parlance, connotes just, equitable or upright. This clearly presupposes that when a termination is challenged as unfair, then a duty is cast on the employer to demonstrate the fairness or justness of the decision. This automatically necessitates a scrutiny of the reason or basis for the termination beyond a mere assertion that one has the right to terminate without cause. Clearly, such an assertion, will not, without more, demonstrate the justness or uprightness of the decision.
The argument that an employer has the right to terminate without reason will still hold provided that the employee challenges the termination as wrongful termination in Court. However, where sections 63 and 64 are invoked, and forms the pith of the employee’s complaint, then that right cannot be said to be co-existent with statute. The law is settled that under the hierarchy of laws, Acts of parliament take precedence over the common law. Therefore, where a statutory right is invoked by the employee, the employer’s common law right is automatically displaced.[51] This view seems to have been endorsed by Baffoe Bonnie JSC in his dissenting opinion in the General Transport case supra thus:
“Section 64 provides for remedies of unfair termination. The Act establishes the Commission and gives its power to investigate complaints of unfair termination and where necessary to order the reinstatement of the said employee if his/her termination is found to be unfair. Here again, this runs counter to the common law principles party autonomy. The only remedy available to such an employee then was damages.”
In fact, under this statutory right, when a complaint of unfair termination is lodged, the NLC has the power to order a reinstatement beyond an order for compensation.[52] This right of reinstatement is not, however, available under the common law. It is patently obvious that the two regimes for challenging termination of employment are dissimilar. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court of Ghana seem to treat even actions for unfair termination as though they were actions for wrongful termination under the common law. This has accounted for the unrepentant position that it has consistently taken without due regard to the clear import of section 63 and 64 of the Labour Act.
For instance, the Supreme Court in National Labour Commission v. Barclays Bank Ltd[53] relied on its earlier decision in George Akpass v. Ghana Commercial Bank[54] to hold that it was bound to follow the decision in George Akpass which earlier held that an employer does not have to assign reasons for terminating the employment of an employee. It is significant to state, as was rightly pointed out by Pwamang JSC in his dissenting opinion in the Barclays Bank case supra, that the George Akpass case was not based on the statutory right of unfair termination, but wrongful dismissal under the common law. Therefore, statements made by the Court in respect of section 63 and 64 were merely obiter dictum without more. However, the Supreme Court relied on the said case as the pith for its holding that an employer has the right to terminate without assigning reasons.[55] This confirms our submission that the Supreme Court seem to conflate unfair termination under Act 651 with the common law action of wrongful termination.
Rethinking the Employer-Employee Balance
The Impact of Modern Labor Standards on Employment Termination Rights
Modern labour standards have significantly reshaped the landscape of employment termination rights by emphasising fairness, transparency and equity in employer-employee relationships. Historically, as demonstrated above, employers held substantial and the power to terminate the employment without cause is rooted in the common law principle that supported the employer’s unilateral right to dismiss. However, contemporary labour laws and standards, such as those enshrined in Ghana’s Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), have progressively limited these traditional rights by establishing clear criteria for what constitutes fair and unfair termination.
These standards prioritise the protection of workers from arbitrary and unjust dismissal by outlining acceptable grounds for termination. The Court’s of Ghana have a duty to interpret the provisions of Act 651 to align with its objectives as captured in the memorandum thereto, rather than rigidly holding on to 19th century principles that are out of touch with modern trends. The conundrum of whether an employer has the right to terminate without reason can be likened to the question of whether the rule in Foss v. Habottle had been dealt away by the Companies Act of Ghana. Since 1962, the repealed Companies Act, 1962 (Act 179) had significantly whittled away the common law rule in Foss v. Habottle. But the Ghanaian courts continued to pay fidelity to that rule until it was significantly dealt away by the Supreme Court in 2012 in the case of PS Investment v. CEREDEC.[56]
Going forward, it is expected that the Supreme Court will take its time to clarify issues of fair and unfair termination within the purview of section 63 & 64 of the Act and not conflate same with the common law action of wrongful dismissal. There is the need for a clear distinction between wrongful termination and unfair termination, and the legal implications for pursuing both options. Furthermore, the interpretation adopted by the Courts in interpreting the Labour Act must have regard to the objectives of the Act and international standards. The time has come for us to evolve to meet the demands of present time, especially considering the peculiar situation in Ghana. As Baffoe Bonnie JSC advocated in the General Transport case supra, the Labour Act must be carefully evaluated considering the reasons and circumstances behind its enactment. The common law principle allowing termination without cause can suppress employees by creating fear of losing their jobs at any moment, subject to the employer’s whims. This highlights the need for a balanced approach that protects employees from arbitrary dismissal while respecting employers' rights.
Policy Implications and Future Directions
Reforming Ghana’s labour law framework is essential to ensure that it meets the demands of a dynamic and evolving labour market. One proposal is to amend the Labour Act, 2003, to provide clearer guidelines on what constitutes fair and unfair termination, incorporating international labour standards and best practices. This would include explicitly defining terms such as the right of an employee to demand reasons from an employer for termination as we see in section 92 of the UK Employment Rights Act 1996.
The Labour Bill 2024 seeks to clarify this position of the law by making the right to terminate with notice subject to the statement of grounds for termination. In other words, by clause 91 of the Labour Bill 2024, either party now has the right to terminate only upon proof of any of the grounds stated in clause 90 of the Bill. This provision is commendable as it now seeks to make all terminations of employment subject to the provision of reasons. This will clarify the current state of the law and bring it in line with contemporary trends.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the evolving landscape of employment termination rights within the context of Ghana’s Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651), highlighting the diminishing common law right of employers to dismiss employees without cause. The discussion has underscored the importance of aligning Ghana’s labour laws with modern standards of fairness and equity, moving away from archaic principles that no longer serve contemporary employment relationships. By contrasting procedural and substantive limitations under Act 651 with the outdated common law approach, it becomes evident that the current legal framework aims to balance the power dynamic between employers and employees.
Policy recommendations for reforming Ghana’s labour laws focus on integrating international standards and best practices to ensure greater clarity and protection against unfair terminations. The proposed Labour Bill 2024 is a step in the right direction, reinforcing the need for employers to provide justifiable reasons for termination and supporting a fairer employment environment.
As the Ghanaian legal system continues to evolve, it is crucial for judicial interpretations to reflect these progressive changes, fostering a more balanced approach to labour rights and maintaining the core objectives of fairness and justice within employment relationships.
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[1] Hugh Collins & Others, Labour Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 95.
[2] Simon Deakin & Wanjiru Njoya, ‘The Legal Framework of Employment Relations’ (2007) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 349, 5< https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/cbrwp349.pdf>accessed 9 September 2024.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hughe & others (n 1) 95.
[6] This common law principle has been incorporated and accepted by the Ghanaian courts and now forms an eternal bedrock that undergirds the Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651). See Kobi v. Ghana Manganese Co Ltd [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 771.
[7] Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488.
[8] Labour Act, 2003 (Act 651) s 62-64
[9] See the recent case of General Transport & Anor v. Halliburton International Incorporated Ghana Branch (2024) JELR 111769 (SC).
[10] Ghana received the common law on 24th July 1874 with the passage of the Judicature Act. The law, however, became operation from 31st March 1876.
[11] See the dictum of Dr Twum JSC in the case of Kobea and Others v Tema Oil Refinery;
Boateng and Others v Tema Oil Refinery (Consolidated) [2003-2004] 2 SCGLR 1033.
[12] Joseph Tenkorang & others, ‘Public service labour relations: A comparative overview’ (2008) Paper no. 17. 66
[13] Memorandum to the Labour Act 2003 (Act 651) para 1.
[14] Ibid para 2.
[15] Labour Act, s 8
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid s 9.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid s 10.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid s 11.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Chitty on Contracts, Law of Contract Vol II (32 Edn. Sweet and Maxwell 2015) para 40-183.
[26] Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578.
[27] Wallace v United Grain Growers Ltd (1997) 152 DLR (4th) 1.
[28] Chitty on Contracts (n 24).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd [1909] AC 488.
[31] Aryee v. State Construction Corporation [1984-86] 1 GLR 424, CA; Bannerman Menson v Ghana Employers Association [1996-97] SCGLR 417.
[32] National Labour Commission v. Barclays Bank [2023] DLSC16995
[33] (2024) JELR 111769 (SC).
[34] [2001] UKHL 13 para 35.
[35] Hugh (n 1) 779.
[36] Johnson v. Unisy [2001] UKHL 13.
[37] Edwin Peel, Treitel: the Law of Contract (14th Edn Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 1-003.
[38] [1998] AC 20.
[39] Hugh (n 1) 779.
[40] Labour Act s 63(1).
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid s 63(2).
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid s 63(4).
[51] The 1992 Constitution art 11.
[52] Labour Act s 64.
[53] [2023] DLSC16995.
[54] Civil Appeal No J4/8/2021 unreported judgment of Supreme Court dated 16th June, 2012.
[55] National Labour Commission v. Barclays Bank [2023] DLSC 16995, paras 24-26.
[56] [2012] DLSC11112.